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## **Impact of Government Regulation No. 46 Year 2013 in Income Tax of Small and Medium Enterprises in Indonesia**

Anna Purwaningsih\*  
University of Atma Jaya Yogyakarta, Indonesia  
Email: annapurwaningsih1977@gmail.com

— *Review of* —  
**Integrative  
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### **ABSTRACT**

This study aims to examine the impact of government's new regulation implementation, Government Regulation (PP) Number 46 Year 2013, on the income tax to be fulfilled by SMEs. Prior to the issuance of the new regulation, SMEs which do not keep books and have a turnover of not more than IDR4.8 billion per year are allowed to calculate the income tax calculation using the norm. In the calculation using the norm, the taxpayer's condition is taken into account by non-taxable income limit (PTKP). Meanwhile in the new rule, income tax calculation does not take into account PTKP any longer, even the tax collected is final. Therefore, many people assume that the implementation of the new rule puts burden on SMEs so that it does not conform to the government's program to promote the people's economy through the development of SMEs.

This research simulates the calculation of income tax calculation based on the norm and based on PP. The results of the calculation are to be compared by applying Paired Sample T test. The result of this research shows the implementation of PP No. 46 of 2013 will hurt taxpayers if the turnover is small and if the norm calculation in the field of business taxpayers is equal to or lower than 4.5 %.

**Keywords:** Self Assessment System, Income Tax, Non-Taxable Income, Taxpayer, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

Indonesia adopts a self-assessment taxation system since 1983. In the self-assessment system, taxpayers are given the freedom to compute, calculate the tax already withheld by a third party, pay, and report their own tax obligations. To run the system self assessment, taxpayers should do the bookkeeping. Bookkeeping is a source of accurate information to ensure that taxpayers meet their tax obligations. Therefore, the taxpayers are required to keep books.

Bookkeeping is an obligation of the taxpayer, but the organization must not add to the weight bookkeeping burden taxpayers. Tax authorities should look at the business scale variations: small, medium, large, local, national, regional, and multi-dimensional (Gunadi, 2009). Not all businesses can afford to keep books. Therefore, the government issued Law No. 7 of 1983 which has been amended several times. Last Modified version is Law No. 36 Year 2007 on Income Tax. In that rule, a taxpayer who has a gross turnover of less than or equal to Rp 4.8 billion can choose to use the norm calculation in compliance with tax obligations so that taxpayers do not have to do the bookkeeping, but just do the recording.

In the Middle of the pros and cons of tax practice implementation using that norm calculation, the government issued new regulations, namely Regulation No. 46 Year 2013 regarding "Income tax on income from businesses received or acquired by a taxpayer who has a certain gross turnover '. The new rules came into effect on July 1, 2013. The new rule provides that any free enterprise, both individuals and entities that have a gross turnover of less than or equal to IDR4.8 billion will be charged a flat rate of 1% and this rule is final. The rule does not apply to income derived from independent personal services. Income from independent activities is income derived from the expertise of individuals without joining any organization. Examples include free work, notaries, doctors, researchers, lecturers, etc. Limits on the maximum gross turnover of IDR 4.8 billion, clearly indicate that this rule will be taxing SMEs.

The difference in taxation between the norm and the final tax of 1% is the existence of non-taxable income. In calculating the tax calculation using norms, non-taxable income is deducted from net income when determining the amount of tax to be paid, while the final tax of 1%, where non-taxable income is not taken into account anymore. Imposition of taxes is based on 1% of gross income per month.

The application of the norm calculation and the final 1% tax is one application of the presumption taxation method, the imposition of income tax on gross income based on rates (Tambunan, 2013). Taxation presumption is usually applied to those who are deemed not willing to register to obtain a TIN (NPWP) and those who have already been registered but have not done their tax obligations [Terkper (2003) in Tambunan (2013)]. Such a group is called the group hard to tax. Hard to tax group include individual entrepreneurs, farmers, professionals who conduct cash transactions, small and medium enterprises [Tanzi and Casangra (1989) in Tambunan (2013)]. The rule was considered only pursue administrative simplicity without promoting the principle of justice.

Simplicity of administration in question is that, when the taxpayers using the norm, they do not have to keep books, but simply do recording. Meanwhile, the adoption of a final tax of 1% means 1% after income tax liability for the tax paid. It is considered complete and final. Thereby, final tax of 1% will reduce the administrative burden for the tax and tax waib.

Final tax of 1% rule is considered unfair and not in favor of SMEs ((Tambunan, 2013). The concept of fairness in taxation is the greater income the greater taxes paid. Income means the net income, which is income minus expenses deduction of income gross which is allowed by the rules of taxation, including the non-taxable income. Non-taxable income deduction is one of the net income, which is based on the condition or the taxpayer's ability to pay. Final income tax is direct calculated from the size of the gross income means net income shall tax will not affect the tax due. In fact, even at a loss, the taxpayer must pay the tax.

Final tax of 1% rule is also not in favor of SMEs (SMEs) because SMEs which have already done the accounting now would not have to do the bookkeeping. Meanwhile, in order to gain ease of access to finance, capital, and credit bank, one of the requirements is the bookkeeping.

Furthermore, the presence of 1% final tax also undermines the concept of self-assessment system (Tambunan, 2013). In the self-assessment system, taxpayers are given the confidence to compute, calculate, pay, and report their own taxation. In fact, the final 1% tax is also not aligned with the goal of self-assessment system, ie paying taxes voluntary compliance.

Based on the differences in how the application of norms and final tax of 1%, this study aims to prove whether the imposition of final income tax of 1%, in Government Regulation No. 46 Year 2013, is more burdensome for individual taxpayers (SMEs) compared to the application of the norm calculation in accordance with Law No. 36 of 2007.

## **2. THEORETICAL AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENTS**

### **2.1. Definition and Function Tax**

Tax is a state tax whose implementation is based on legislation in force and in the absence of direct contra. Thus, taxpayers who do not comply may be subject to legal sanctions. The taxpayer does not receive direct contra the tax paid as taxes used state funding sources.

Tax has two functions, namely as budgetair and regulerend. Budgetair function means a



source of tax revenue for the state, while the tax as a means of tax regulerend function used for certain purposes outside the financial sector. For example, taxes are used to protect people from the habit of consuming liquor, then issued Sales Tax on Luxury Goods (PPnBM). Both of these functions is a unity that can not be separated (Mansour, 1999). For example, as a source of state income tax from the public but the implementation still has to consider the social, economic, and cultural communities.

## **2.2. Tax Collection System**

There are three tax collection system, namely the self-assessment system, the official assessment system, and hybrid systems / semi self assessment system (Rosdiana & Irianto, 2012). In the self-assessment system taxpayers are given the freedom to compute, calculate, deposit, and report their own tax. The tax authorities only act as a watchdog that will check the completeness and correctness of the taxpayer reports

The tax authorities play an active role in the official assessment system, ie the tax authorities to calculate and determine the amount each taxpayer. Taxpayer pays taxes based on tax assessments issued by the tax authorities. Meanwhile, the hybrid system is better known as the withholding system, tax is deducted or be collected by the employer.

Implementation of the three systems developed in new forms of so-called pseudo official assessment system or pseudo self assessment system, because the characteristics of the self assessment system or system official assessment blinded (Rosdiana & Irianto, 2012). For example in Indonesia is the norm and the final tax calculation. In both these instances, do not apply the general provisions, which the taxpayer must calculate its own 'additional net economic benefit'. Thus, indirectly, that the tax authorities determine the amount of tax to be paid by the taxpayer.

## **2.3. Norm Calculation and Final Tax 1%**

Norma counting is one method used Indonesian presumption to tax taxpayers who do not keep books. Norm calculation is based on the careful research that (1) simple, (2) detailed by a group of business, (3) are distinguished by the location of the company, (4) differentiated according to the size of the company or the individual circumstances of the taxpayer; (5) distinguished between individual taxpayers and business entities (Sari, 2012).



The purpose of calculating the norm is (1) to facilitate the implementation of the compliance obligations of the taxpayer, and (2) to prevent the arbitrary actions of the tax administration determines the amount of taxable income that has no basis [Shome (1995) in Sari (2012)]. Thus, the norm calculation is a way of calculating the taxable income of the aberrant because of the absence of a better basis for the calculation, ie bookkeeping (Soemitro, 1998).

Government Regulation Number 46 of 2013 regulates the final 1% tax for individual taxpayers and co operations not included Agency Permanent Establishment (PE). Tax bases used is one month's gross income and are final. Meanwhile, taxpayers who derive income from independent activities are exempt from this rule. In other words, taxpayers who derive income from independent activities continue to use the norm calculation.

#### **2.4. Presumptive Taxation Method**

Thuronyi sates that there are six reasons of presumptive technique, that is, simplification, tax avoidance or evasion, administrative corruption, rebuttable presumption, incentive effect and combination of reasons.

Presumptive techniques may be employed for a variety of reasons. One is simplification, particularly in relation to the compliance burden on taxpayers with very low turnover (and the corresponding administrative burden of auditing such taxpayers). A second is to combat tax avoidance or evasion (which works only if the indicators on which the presumption is based are more difficult to hide than those forming the basis for accounting records). Third, by providing objective indicators for tax assessment, presumptive methods may lead to a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, when normal accounts-based methods are unreliable because of problems of taxpayer compliance or administrative corruption. Fourth, rebuttable presumptions can encourage taxpayers to keep proper accounts, because they subject taxpayers to a possibly higher tax burden in the absence of such accounts. Fifth, presumptions of the exclusive type (see below) can be considered desirable because of their incentive effects—a taxpayer who earns more income will not have to pay more tax. Finally, presumptions that serve as minimum taxes may be justified by a combination of reasons (revenue need, fairness concerns, and political or technical difficulty in addressing certain problems directly as opposed to doing so through a minimum tax) (Thuronyi, 1996).

The application of the norm calculation and the final 1% tax is one application of the presumption taxation method, that is simplification (the first reason).

On the most mundane level presumptive methods can be adopted for simple administrative convenience, usually as a substitute for taxation of actual income as shown in accounting books and records. In many instances such records do not exist or cannot be effectively audited. Sometimes aiming for the best can give poorer results (Tanzi & Jantscher, 1987).

## **2.5. Government Regulation (PP) No. 46 Year 2013**

The object of the income subject to income tax which is final (final income) in PP 46, effective from July 1, 2013 is the income of the business derived by the taxpayer with gross turnover no more than IDR4.8 billion per year. It excludes income from independent personal services such as doctors, lawyers, notaries and others. It also excludes incomes that are subject to final income tax such as construction services and rental or sale of assets, land and buildings. The tax subjects in PP 46 are persons and co operations not included Agency Permanent Establishment (PE) who derives income which is object of final income (Mustadir, 2013; Indonesia, 2013).

Exceptions are also individual entrepreneurs in trade and/or services using facilities or infrastructure that can be assembled and using public places as a place of business such as street vendors, hawkers or such a like taxpayers. The final income is due to the application of the 1% (one percent) tax rate on the circulation of business every month. Only by recording the business cycle, the tax can be easily calculated, especially if the business entity has been obliged to carry out the bookkeeping (Mustadir, 2013; Indonesia, 2013).

## **2.6. Small Medium Entreprizes**

Under Law No. 9 of 1995 on Small Entreprizes, said small business is a business which has annual sales of up to IDR 1 billion (Indonesia, 1995). Meanwhile, Law no. 20 Year 2008 on SMEs states that included SME's are individual businesses or entities with maximum effort circulation IDR 50 billion a year (Indonesia, 2008). From both these laws can be ascertained that the PP No. 46 of 2013, the limitation for businesses with gross turnover of no more IDR 4.8 billion, aims to tax SMEs.

## **2.7. Hypothesis Development**

In the tax calculation using the norm, not taxable income is

deducted from net income when determining the amount of tax to be paid. Meanwhile, with the implementation of PP No. 46 of 2013 (1% final income tax), the existence of non-taxable income is not taken into account anymore. Non-taxable income is a form of protection to the taxpayer. If taxpayers earning below the taxable income of the taxpayer will not be collected taxes. Thus, the research hypothesis can be stated that:

Alternative hypothesis: Payable calculation using the basic norm smaller than 1% of final income tax

### 3. RESEARCH METHOD

This is a quasi experimental study by means of simulation data. The data used is the simulation results based on gross income tax regulations. Limits the amount of gross income for the company to use the norm calculation and can use the new rules PP. 46 of gross income in 2013 is less than or equal to IDR4.8 billion.

Therefore, the data simulasian used in this study is a gross turnover of IDR 1 million, followed IDR 5 million and the next multiple of five million to IDR 4.8 billion. Thus the steps to be performed are as follows:

1. Compiling data on gross income of IDR 1 million, IDR 5 million to Rp 10 million, and so on up IDR 4.8 billion
2. Calculating the upper income tax on gross income which has been determined by calculating the norm

Net income = gross turnover x norm calculation

Taxable income = Net Income – Nontaxable Income

Income tax payable = Rate of Article 17 x Taxable Income

Note:

a. Norma calculation used is:

- Scenario 1 = rate 25%
- Scenario 2 = rate of 10%
- Scenario 3 = rate 9%
- Scenario 4 = rate 4.5%

b. Election norm calculation based on the smallest norm, ie 4.5% and rose to 25%.

c. Non taxable Income

Taxpayer Status	Non-taxable income (IDR)	Taxpayer Status	Non-taxable income (IDR)

TK/0	24.300.000	K/0	26.325.000
TK/1	26.325.000	K/1	28.350.000
TK/2	28.350.000	K/2	30.375.000
TK/3	30.375.000	K/3	32.400.000

d. Rates of Income Tax Article 17 =

- Taxable income = 0 - IDR 50 million, rate 5%
- Taxable income = IDR 50–250 million, rates 15%
  - Taxable income = IDR 250-500 million, rates 25%
  - Taxable income = IDR 500 million and above, the rate of 30%

3. Calculate income tax on gross income above a basic use PP. 46 in 2013

$\text{Tax payable} = \text{Gross Turnover} \times 1\%$
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4. Comparing the calculation results between steps 2 and 3 by using the test-pair sample t test (assuming normally distributed data) (Gujarati, 2009).

5. Doing discussion of results

Statistical hypothesis in this study is formulated as follows:

H0: Income tax due using the basic norm calculation is greater than or equal to 1% final income

Ha: Tax payable calculation using the basic norm is less than 1% final income

Description:

- a. If the p-value of  $<0.05$  means that the hypothesis is accepted, it means income tax payable calculation using the basic norm is more advantageous than using a 1% final income tax or the application of 1% final income tax payers detriment.
- b. If the p-value  $> 0.05$  means that the hypothesis is rejected, meaning that the income tax payable calculation using the basic norm is more detrimental than using a 1% final income tax or the application of 1% final income tax benefit the taxpayer.

## 4. EMPIRICAL RESULT

### 4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Individual Data

#### 4.1.1. Scenario 1: Calculation Norm 25% versus 1% final income

Descriptive statistics income tax payable by the taxpayer deemed profit of 25% and 1% final income tax can be seen in table 1.

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics Scenario 1

Income Tax	Mean	Standard Error	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Final 1%	24.000.010	447.679	24.000.000	13.878.037	10.000	48.000.000
TK/0	126.824.295	2.984.726	117.710.000	92.508.726	-	297.710.000
TK/1 and K/0	126.320.411	2.980.931	117.102.500	92.388.116	-	297.102.500
TK/2 and K/1	125.817.438	2.977.109	116.495.000	92.266.449	-	296.495.000
TK/3 and K/2	125.315.290	2.973.263	115.887.500	92.143.840	-	295.887.500
K/3	124.813.975	2.969.394	115.280.000	92.020.287	-	295.280.000

Meanwhile, the income tax payable calculation results show that the application of 1% final income tax disadvantage for taxpayers who have low turnover. For example, when a turnover of less than IDR100,000,000 so taxpayers do not have to pay taxes if calculations using norm calculation. Meanwhile, if the turnover of IDR100,000,000 year taxpayers will be taxed at IDR35,000.00 (calculated using a deemed profit of 25%) and the tax will be charged IDR1,000,000.00 (calculations using 1% final income tax). Taxpayer status TK/1 and K/0 will be taxed IDR58,000 (if the calculation with the norm) and the tax will be charged IDR1,100,000 (if the calculation with Final Income Tax 1%). The data can be seen in Table 2.

Table 2. Imposition of Tax Differences Using Calculation Norm 25% and Final Income Tax of 1%

Gross Turnover	Final 1%	Norm 25%				
		TK/0	TK/1 and K/0	TK/2 and K/1	TK/3 and K/2	K/3
100,000,000	1,000,000	35,000	-	-	-	-
110,000,000	1,100,000	...	58,750	-	-	-
115,000,000	1,150,000	...	...	20,000	-	-
125,000,000	1,250,000	...	...	...	43,750	-
130,000,000	1,300,000	...	...	...	...	5,000

#### 4.1.2. Scenario 2: Calculation Norm 10% versus Final Income Tax of 1%

The second scenario which shows the descriptive statistics calculation results of the calculation of income tax payable based on the norm of 10% and 1% final income tax can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Descriptive Statistics Scenario 2

Income Tax	Mean	Standard Error	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Final 1%	24,000,010	447,679	24,000,000	13,878,037	10,000	48,000,000
TK/0	32,378,356	828,681	27,355,000	25,689,096	-	83,925,000
TK1 and K/0	32,025,468	824,382	27,051,250	25,555,840	-	83,418,750
TK/2 and K/1	31,674,714	820,043	26,747,500	25,421,336	-	82,912,500
TK/3 and K/2	31,326,093	815,665	26,443,750	25,285,608	-	82,406,250
K/3	30,979,605	811,248	26,140,000	25,148,683	-	81,900,000

Meanwhile, the income tax payable calculation results show that the application of 1% final income tax is disadvantageous for taxpayers who have low turnover. For example, when a turnover of less than IDR245,000,000 so taxpayers do not have to pay taxes if calculations using norm calculation. Meanwhile, if the turnover of IDR 245,000,000,000, the taxpayer will be taxed at IDR10,000.00 if the tax calculation using 25% deemed profit and tax will be charged IDR2,450,000.00 if using 1% final income tax. The data can be seen in Table 4. Taxpayer status TK / 1 and K / 0 will be taxed USD 8750.00 (if calculations with the norm) and the taxpayer will be taxed IDR2,650,000 (if the calculation with Final Income Tax 1%).

Table 4. Imposition of Tax Differences Using Calculation  
Norm 10% and 1% final income tax (individual)

Gross Turnover	Final 1%	Norm 10%				
		TK/0	TK/1 and K/0	TK/2 and K/1	TK/3 and K/2	K/3
245,000,000	2,450,000	10,000	-	-	-	-
265,000,000	2,650,000	...	8,750	-	-	-
285,000,000	2,850,000	...	...	7,500	-	-
305,000,000	3,050,000	...	...	...	6,250	-
325,000,000	3,250,000	...	...	...	...	5,000



### 4.1.3. Scenario 3: Calculation Norm 9% versus Final Income Tax of 1%

The third scenario which shows the descriptive statistics calculation results of the calculation of income tax payable based on the norm of 9% and 1% final income tax can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Descriptive Statistics Scenario 3

No taxable income	Mean	Standard Error	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Final 1%	24,000,010	447,679	24,000,000	13,878,037	10,000	48,000,000
TK/0	27,315,671	703,027	23,755,000	21,793,837	-	71,925,000
TK/1 and K/0	26,979,649	698,681	23,451,250	21,659,121	-	71,418,750
TK/2 and K/1	26,646,142	694,293	23,147,500	21,523,087	-	70,912,500
TK/3 and K/2	26,315,009	689,868	22,843,750	21,385,920	-	70,406,250
K/3	22,965,510	589,080	21,730,000	18,261,469	-	64,880,000

Meanwhile, the income tax payable calculation results show that the application of 1% final income tax is disadvantageous for taxpayers who have low turnover. For example, when a turnover under IDR275.000.000 the taxpayer does not have to pay taxes if calculations using norm calculation. Meanwhile, if the turnover IDR2.750.000 the taxpayer will be taxed at IDR22.500, 00 if the tax calculations using norm counting 25% and will be taxed IDR1.000.000, 00 if using 1% final income tax. The data can be seen in Table 6.

Table 6. Imposition of Tax Differences Using Calculation Norm 9% and 1% Final Income Tax (individual)

Gross Turnover	Final 1%	Norm 9%				
		TK/0	TK/1 and K/0	TK/2 and K/1	TK/3 and K/2	K/3
275,000,000	2,750,000	22,500	-	-	-	-
295,000,000	2,950,000	...	11,250	-	-	-
320,000,000	3,200,000	...	...	22,500	-	-
340,000,000	3,400,000	...	...	...	11,250	-
365,000,000	3,650,000	...	...	...	...	22,500

### 4.1.4. Scenario 4: Calculation Norm 4.5% Versus 1% Final Income Tax



The fourth scenario which shows the descriptive statistics calculation results of the calculation of income tax payable based on the norm of 4.5% and 1% final income tax can be seen in Table 7.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics Scenario 4

Income Tax	Mean	Standard Error	Median	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Final 1%	24,000,010	47,679	24,000,000	13,878,037	10,000	48,000,000
TK/0	8,904,334	48,108	7,555,000	7,691,344	-	23,755,000
TK/1 and K/0	8,683,127	245,290	7,251,250	7,604,004	-	23,451,250
TK/2 and K/1	8,464,765	242,413	6,947,500	7,514,816	-	23,147,500
TK/3 and K/2	8,249,247	239,479	6,643,750	7,423,849	-	22,843,750
K/3	8,036,574	236,489	6,340,000	7,331,170	-	22,540,000

Meanwhile, the income tax payable calculation results show that the application of 1% final income tax is disadvantageous for taxpayers who have low turnover. For example, when a turnover under IDR275.000.000 the taxpayer does not have to pay taxes if calculations using norm calculation. Meanwhile, if the turnover IDR275.000.000 taxpayer will have to pay tax for IDR22.500 if the tax calculations using a deemed profit will be 4.5% and taxed IDR2.750.000 if using 1% final income tax. The data can be seen in Table 8.

Table 8. Imposition of Tax Differences Using Calculation Norm 4.5% and 1% Final Income Tax (individual)

Gross Turnover	Final 1%	Norm 4.5%				
		TK/0	TK/1 and K/0	TK/2 and K/1	TK/3 and K/2	K/3
275,000,000	2,750,000	22,500	-	-	-	-
295,000,000	2,950,000	...	11,250	-	-	-
320,000,000	3,200,000	...	...	22,500	-	-
340,000,000	3,400,000	...	...	...	11,250	-
365,000,000	3,650,000	...	...	...	...	22,500

## 4.2. Hypothesis Testing

The results of hypothesis testing using paired sample t test on the four scenarios can be seen in Table 9. In the first scenario, it is seen that all positive t value and p value is 0.000 (less than 5%). This suggests that the difference between the total

of income tax calculated using the norm and 1% final income tax differ significantly. T is a positive value indicates that the 25% deemed profit tax calculation will result in a greater than income tax calculation with the final tax 1%. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected at the first scenario.

Test results in the second scenario shows that all positive t value and p value is 0.000 (smaller than  $\alpha = 5\%$ ). This suggests that the difference between the total of income tax calculated using the norm and 1% final income tax differ significantly. T is a positive value indicates that the 10% deemed profit tax calculation will result in a greater than income tax calculation with the final tax 1%. Thus, in the second scenario the hypothesis is rejected.

Test results on the third scenario shows that all positive t value and p value is 0.000 (smaller than  $\alpha = 5\%$ ). This suggests that the difference between the total of income tax calculated using the norm and 1% final income tax differ significantly. T is a positive value indicates that the norm of 9% calculation would result in a greater tax calculation than Income tax calculation with the final tax 1%. Thus, in the third scenario hypothesis is rejected.

Test results on four scenarios show that all values of t is negative and the p value 0 (smaller than  $\alpha = 0.05$  level). This suggests that the difference between the total of income tax calculated using the norm and 1% final income tax differ significantly. T is a negative value indicates that the 4.5% norm calculation will result in a smaller tax calculation than income tax calculation with the final 1%. Thus, in the fourth scenario hypothesis is accepted.

Table 9. Matrix Test Results Using Paired Sample T-Test

<b>Scenario 1</b>	<b>T value</b>	<b>P value</b>
<b>Norm 25% vs Final tax 1%</b>		
TK/0	t=40.498	0.000
TK/1 and K/0	t=40.362	0.000
TK/2 and K/1	t=40.226	0.000
TK/3 and K/2	t= 40.090	0.000
K/3	t=-39.955	0.000
<b>Scenario 2</b>	<b>T value</b>	<b>P value</b>
<b>Norm 10% vs Final tax 1%</b>		
TK/0	t= 21.242	0.000
TK/1 and K/0	t=20.549	0.000
TK/2 and K/1	t= 19.848	0.000
TK/3 and K/2	t=19.140	0.000
K/3	t=18.423	0.000

<b>Scenario 3</b> <b>Norm 9% vs Final tax 1%</b>	<b>T value</b>	<b>P value</b>
TK/0	t= 12.150	0.000
TK/1 and K/0	t=11.069	0.000
TK/2 and K/1	t=9.968	0.000
TK/3 and K/2	t= 8.844	0.000
K/3	t=2.385	0.000
<b>Scenario 1</b> <b>Norm 4.5% vs Final tax 1%</b>	<b>T value</b>	<b>P value</b>
TK/0	t=-71.978	0
TK/1 and K/0	t=-71.868	0
TK/2 and K/1	t=-71.726	0
TK/3 and K/2	t=-71.558	0
K/3	t=-71.364	0

Based on the results of testing four of the scenario means that the income tax will hurt taxpayers if the norm calculation in the sector 4.5% or lower. This is because the calculation of the final income tax of 1% would result in a bigger tax.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The results of individual data analysis on the four scenarios, indicate that the final tax calculations using income tax of 1% would result in a smaller tax than the tax calculations using norm. Nevertheless, the overall test results using paired sample t tests showed different results. Tests on scenario 1 (norm computation 25%) , scenario 2 (norm computation 10%) , and scenario 3 (norm computation 9%) showed similar results, ie, the amount of income tax computed using the counting norm is greater compared the results of calculations using the income tax the final 1 % . Meanwhile, the test results in the fourth scenario (norm computation 4.5%) indicates that the amount of income tax computed using the norm calculation is smaller compared the results of calculations using the final 1% income tax.

Thus, the implementation of PP No. 46 of 2013 will hurt taxpayers if the turnover is small and if the norm calculation in the field of business taxpayers is equal to or lower than 4.5 %.

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